COMMENTS
RETAIL GASOLINE FRANCHISE
TERMINATIONS AND NONRENEWALS
UNDER TITLE I OF THE
PETROLEUM MARKETING
PRACTICES ACT
Only since World War II has franchising become a distinct
method of marketing.'. Although franchise law is now recognized as a
separate entity,2 the dimensions of this area of the law remain unclear.
"Business franchises enjoy an elusive status because they involve aspects of sales, agency, lease, license, trademark, employment, and joint
venture."' 3 The fact that franchise law draws on so many different aspects of the law, yet does not fit completely into any one area, has led
some commentators to suggest that franchising is "sui generis. '' 4 Accordingly, legal precedents from contract or trademark law alone may
be of only limited utility in analyzing franchise problems. Instead, resolution of franchise disputes frequently depends upon judicial adaptaTHE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS COMMENT:
H.R. REP. No. 161, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 161];
ProposedPetroleum MarketingPracticesAct: Hearingson HA 130 Be/ore the Subcomn. on
Energy andPowerof the House Comm. on InterstateandForeign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearings];
Brown, Franchising--A FiduciaryRelationshio, 49 TEx. L. REV. 650 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Brown];
Jordan, tnconscionabilityat the Gas Station, 62 MINN. L. REV. 813 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Jordan].
1. Brown 650.
2. See, e.g., Title I of Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2801-2806 (West
Supp. 1979) (also known as the "Dealers' Day in Court Act"). This Act is the latest step in the
movement toward recognizing franchising as a unique branch of the law. The Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1976), brought franchise regulation to the federal
level for the first time. See generally Note, Hope Yetfor theAutomobile Dealers'Dayin Court Act:
Marquis v. Chrysler Corp., 1979 DUKE L.J. 1185. In addition, most states have adopted some type
of franchise regulation legislation, and at least 30 states now specifically regulate oil franchises to
some degree. Hearings 227 (statement of D.R. Martin).
3. Note, ConstitutionalObstaclesto State "Good Cause" Restrictions on FranchiseTerminations, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1487, 1488 (1974).
4. Note, Regulation ofFranchising,59 MINN. L. REv. 1027, 1029 (1975); see Brown 663-64;
Note, A Sui Generis Approach to FranchiseTermination, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 545 (1975).
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tions of other legal doctrines, or upon legislative directives.
In recent years, much of the development in franchising law has
been in the area of franchise relationships between petroleum product
suppliers and dealers. Courts and legislatures have placed particular

emphasis on preventing petroleum product suppliers from arbitrarily
and unjustly terminating their retail gasoline franchisees.5 Numerous
states have passed statutes that prohibit an oil franchisor from terminating a dealer-franchisee without "good cause."' 6 In 1978, after five

years of debate, Congress passed the Petroleum Marketing Practices
Act (the Act).7 Title I of the Act 8 federalizes the law of oil franchise

regulation and prohibits an oil franchisor from terminating or failing to

renew a dealer-franchisee except for narrowly defined "good cause." 9
The Act also creates a private cause of action for gasoline station dealers who believe their franchises have been unjustly terminated. 10 The
passage of the Act could affect not only the relationship between oil

companies and their service station dealers, but also consumers through
changes in gasoline prices and the quality of dealer service. The Act's
passage also adds another variable to the increasingly complicated national energy situation. This Comment will explore the problems ad-

dressed by this legislation and analyze the solutions the statute offers.
The Comment will then discuss possible sources of conffict between the
Act and other laws and set forth a framework for judicial reconciliation
5. In the vast majority of retail oil franchises, the franchisor is a major oil company.
Franchise termination legislation is aimed primarily at these companies, because of their clear
economic superiority over retail station franchisees. Nevertheless, in the recently enacted Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2801-2806 (West Supp. 1979), Congress refused to
accept an amendment that would have exempted small oil suppliers from the Act's provisions.
makes little difference whether the supplier is a
Congress apparently adopted the view that "[ilt
jobber or a major oil company. The relationship is the same. A shot from a 22 may be just as
lethal as a shot from a 45." Hearings 128 (statement of Charles L. Binsted).
6. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 20999-20999.3 (West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 106-1101 to -1112 (Supp. 1977); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 199-a to -j (McKinney Supp. 1978).
Other states protect franchised gasoline dealers through general franchise statutes. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-133e to -133g (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE tit. 6, §§ 2551-2556
(1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:10-1 to -12 (West Supp. 1979).
7. Pub. L. No. 95-297, 92 Stat. 322 (1978) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2801-2841 (West
Supp. 1979)).
8. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2801-2806 (West Supp. 1979). Title II, which deals with octane ratings,
and Title III, which deals with motor fuels subsidization, are outside the scope of this Comment.
All references to the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act or to "the Act" pertain only to Title I.
9. Id. § 2802. The legislative history of the Act reveals that Title I was designed to establish
"minimum federal standards governing the termination and non-renewal of franchise relationships for sale of motor fuel by the franchisor or supplier of such fuel . . . . Title I establishes
protection for franchisees from arbitrary or discriminatory terminations or non-renewal of
franchises." S. REP. No. 731, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 873.
10. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2805 (West Supp. 1979).
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of these competing interests. Finally, the commercial setting of the
franchise relationship will be analyzed to determine the relevance of
economic and business variables to the resolution of franchise termination disputes under the Act.
I.

THE IMPETUS FOR PASSAGE OF THE PETROLEUM MARKETING
PRACTICES ACT

A. The Needfor Regulation and the Justification Supplied by
Franchise Theory.
The Petroleum Marketing Practices Act addresses the problem of
unjust termination of gasoline dealership franchises by suppliers. The
passage of the Act was the culmination of a progression of events that
began in the mid-1960s. First, commentators focused their attention on
the problem of unjust franchise termination."' Next, commentators
and some courts began to regard the franchise relationship as a "joint
venture"' 12 in which both parties to the franchise had a duty to treat
each other fairly. Third, other commentators and courts adopted the
view that a franchisor is a fiduciary to the franchisee, so that the
3
franchisor may not terminate the franchisee without "good cause."'
Finally, many states, implicitly adopting the "fiduciary" model of the
franchise, passed franchise termination statutes, thereby precipitating
the call for a federal franchise termination act.14 A full understanding
of the purposes and effect of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act
requires an awareness of these developments, and an understanding of
the characteristics of gasoline franchises.
In a typical oil franchise arrangement the franchisor, usually a major oil company, enters into a franchise relationship with a local dealer.
The franchisor owns the land upon which the service station rests; a
lease of the land is part of the franchise arrangement. These leases set
a high minimum rent supplemented by a payment based on the
number of gallons of gasoline sold by the dealer.' 5 In addition, the
franchisor may set "minimum gallonage" requirements that increase as
sales increase. An increase in sales in any given month will thus force
6
the franchisee to sell even more in the following month.'
In addition to these monetary aspects of the oil franchise relation11. See, e.g., Gellhom, Limitationson ContractTermination Rights-FranchiseCancellations,
1967 DUKE L.J. 465.
12. See text accompanying notes 26-29 infra.
13. See note 30 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 32-34 infra and accompanying text.
15. Brown 656.
16. See, e.g., Malone v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 474 F. Supp. 306 (D. Md. 1979).
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ship, other provisions may cause difficulties for franchisees. The franchisee may be required to stay open twenty-four hours per day, even
when this practice is unprofitable. 17 Similarly, the franchisee may be
forced to participate in prize games and to buy tires, batteries, and accessories from the oil supplier at inflated rates. Requirements like these
18
can reduce the dealer's already slim profit margin.
Oil franchise agreements generally allow immediate termination
of the relationship by the oil company if the agreement's requirements
are not fully met by the dealer. The combination of financial hardship,
onerous franchise requirements, and ease of termination may explain
the very high attrition rate among dealers in the past. 19
In response to the criticism that the oil franchise relationship was
unfair to the dealer-franchisee, the oil companies pointed out that the
typical oil franchise offers the franchisee an opportunity to enter a profitable business with a relatively small amount of capital. The
franchisor has already purchased the land and equipment, and may
even finance a large portion of the dealer's initial investment costs. In
addition, the franchisee receives extensive training, a credit card system, and the established trade of the oil company in return for his investment. 20 Oil companies also argued that abuses by franchisors were
unlikely because dealers who are satisfied with the franchise relationship are likely to be more productive. 2 1 Furthermore, an oil company
that terminates dealers without sufficient cause loses the time and
money it has invested in the franchise relationship. Thus, it may be in
the oil company's interest to form a "long, harmonious relationship"
22
with its dealers.
Prior to the passage of the Act most commentators rejected the oil
companies' arguments and concluded that the typical oil franchise relationship was unfair to the dealer-franchisee. Professor Harold Brown,
the leading scholar in the field of franchise law, put it this way:
In the Nation's second largest industry, the major oil firms have the
gasoline station dealers in virtual bondage, hinged on the constant
threat that their short-term contracts will not be renewed unless they
It is gensubmit to burdensome franchisor-imposed practices ....
erally conceded that the gasoline station situation is almost hopeless
17. See, e.g., Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 877 (8th Cir. 1979), cer. denied, 48
U.S.L.W. 3693 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1980).
18. Brown 657.
19. In 1975 it was reported that "the annual turnover of gas station dealers based on insolvency, terminations, and failure to renew varies from 25-40%." Note, A Sui Generis Approach,
supra note 4, at 546.
20. Jordan 819-20.
21. Id.
22. Id. 820-21.
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and offers a prime example of the worst abuses in franchising ....
[T]he23major oil companies have proven almost impervious to at-

tack.

In the past, the franchisee could find some legal relief through contract 24 or antitrust 2 5 actions, but these methods proved unsatisfactory in
23. Brown 655-57. See also FTC v. Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 226-27 (1968) (recognizing the
economic dominance of the oil company in a franchise relationship); Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello,
63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert.denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974). In Marinelo, the court read an
implied "good cause" termination clause into an oil franchise agreement. In so holding, the court
took notice of the greatly superior economic position of Shell vis-a-vis its franchisee. 63 N.J. at
408, 307 A.2d at 601.
The hue and cry over the oil franchisors' dominance of the franchise relationship reached
new heights when the president of the National Congress of Petroleum Retailers analogized the
franchisees' situation to slavery: "Gentlemen, those of you who watched 'Roots' on TV will understand when I say, '[the franchisees] want to leave the plantation.'" Hearings 127 (statement of
Charles R. Matties).
24. Prior to the enactment of state legislation that explicitly set out a "good cause" standard
for franchise termination, courts were reluctant to imply this standard into franchise agreements.
Courts relied instead on basic contract law to hold that "terminable at will" clauses were valid
since the parties had freely bargained for them. See, e.g., Goldinger v. Boron Oil Co., 375 F.
Supp. 400 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1975); Russell v. Shell Oil Co., 382 F.
Supp. 395 (E.D. Mich.), aj'd,497 F.2d 924 (6th Cir. 1974); North Penn Oil & Tire Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 371 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Pa. 1974). Historically, contract law has proved to be an
inadequate remedy for unjust terminations. See Note, Termination of Franchise Without Good
Cause Is Void as Against PublicPolicy, 45 Miss. L.J. 252, 257 (1974) (freedom to contract is an
illusion in the franchise setting). Recently, however, courts have begun to use the unconscionability doctrine to give franchisees relief from termination clauses. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied,415 U.S. 920 (1974); Ashland Oil, Inc. v.
Donahue, 223 S.E. 2d 433 (W. Va. 1976). See text accompanying notes 114-34 infra.
25. Gasoline dealer franchise terminations and nonrenewals frequently raise antitrust issues.
Franchisees may argue that the terms of the agreement whose breach gave grounds for the termination violate the antitrust laws, or that threats of termination or nonrenewal were used to coerce
participation in an illegal agreement. For example, franchisees may contend that the supplier
tried to fix the retail price of gasoline. Agreements between buyers and sellers fixing the buyers'
resale prices are illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John
D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). Resale price fixing may also be illegal in consignment
arrangments. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964). But see United States v. General
Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926) (Dr.Miles not applicable to a consignment arrangement). Arnott v.
American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3693 (U.S. Apr. 29,
1980), offers an example of this problem in a gasoline franchise. The franchisee contended that
the franchisor had violated section I by dictating maximum retail prices and by enforcing the
price scheme in threatening to terminate the agreement if the franchisee resisted. The Eighth
Circuit found evidence of a combination that was sufficient to invoke the per se rule against resale
price maintenance. 609 F.2d at 885. The court relied on Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145
(1968), which extended the Dr.Miles rule to agreements setting maximum prices. 609 F.2d at 885.
Judge Bright, however, found insufficient evidence of a conspiracy or combination. Id. at 891-93
(Bright, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Bright also suggested, but did not decide, that the
per se rule for maximum resale price maintenance might survive in light of Continental T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 609 F.2d at 891 n.6 (Bright, J., concurring and dissenting). Sylvania restored the "rule of reason" approach to analysis of vertical territorial restraints.
Franchisees may also allege that a termination or nonrenewal constitutes an illegal refusal to
deal. Franchisors enjoy a right to refuse to deal under the doctrine of United States v. Colgate &
Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), but this doctrine is narrowly defined.
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resolving termination disputes. In response to these problems, a new
legal theory developed that offered the franchisee significant protection
from unjust terminations. This new approach sought to dispel the notion that a franchise can be analyzed through the use of a traditional
contract model.26 A franchise is now viewed as a "joint venture" 27 in
which the franchisor and the franchisee have a duty to treat each other
fairly. As a result, "important legal consequences flow from the judicial determination that an agreement is a franchise rather than another
28
type of contract.
The joint venture theory is premised on the idea that both parties
to a franchise contribute to the overall viability and profitability of the
business. The franchisor provides a recognized trademark and products, while the franchisee, through good service to the public, generates
goodwill and profits for the franchisor. Thus, between the franchisor
and franchisee, there are
mutual obligations of good faith, especially in the manner of their
protecting the goodwill in the trademark ....

While the franchisee

necessarily places his faith and confidence in the franchisor, the latter
may also be substantially reliant on each franchisee, not merely for
its own interest, but also 29as guardian for the interests of the other
franchisees in the system.

In theory, then, the franchise relationship in the joint venture
model is an integrated whole in which the respective parties work to[I]f a manufacturer seeks to achieve resale price maintenance or any other unlawful vertical restraint through the exercise of its right:to refuse to deal and a prior announcement
of policy, the manufacturer's conduct remains lawful only so long as no step in addition
to announcement of policy and withdrawal of trade from violators is taken by the manufacturer. If a manufacturer sets up a policing mechanism to discover violators, if it reinstates violators upon declarations of their intent to comply in the future, the Colgate
defense is gone.
L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST

393 (1977) (footnotes omitted).

A third common source of antitrust claims by service station franchisees against gasoline
franchisors arises from "tying arrangements," in which the franchisor sells gasoline only if the
franchisee agrees to purchase his tires, batteries, and accessories from the franchisor. Such an
arrangement may be illegal under section I of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), section 3 of
the Clayton Act, id. § 14, or section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, id. § 45. See, e.g.,
Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1966).
While the antitrust laws offer franchisees some relief from unjust terminations, they do so
only in very specific situations where proof is likely to be difficult and the law unclear. Further,
antitrust remedies are arguably deficient in providing the successful franchisee-plaintiff only with
damages and not with the injunctive relief that would restore his service station to him. Finally,
antitrust actions are too time-consuming and costly for the typical oil franchisee. See Note, Regulation of Franchising,supra note 4, at 1033-34. See generally Bohling, Franchise Terminations
Under the Sherman Act: Populism and RelationalPower, 53 TEx. L. REv. 1180 (1975).
26. See, e.g., Brown & Cohen, FranchiseMisuse, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1145, 1163 (1973).
27. Id.
28. Note, supra note 24, at 257.
29. Brown & Cohen, supra note 26, at 1163.
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gether toward a common goal. As an offshoot of this joint venture theory, one commentator proposed that because franchisors enjoy strong
control over the franchise relationship, they should be considered
fiduciaries to their franchisees and thus be bound to protect the fran30
chisees' position.

Application of these theoretical constructs to the termination situation produces "a requirement that a franchise cannot be terminated or

subjected to a failure to renew unless the franchisor can sustain the
burden of proving 'good cause.' "13 Good cause termination statutes
are in part a result of this new theory of the franchise.
B.

State Statutory Response and the CallforFederalLegislation.
At least thirty states responded to the need for a redefinition of the

32
franchise relationship by passing some type of franchising statute.

Some of these statutes deal specifically with service station franchises,

while the remainder are general franchise regulation acts that cover all
franchise relationships. 33 The typical state statute prohibits franchise

30. See generallyBrown. Although courts have for some time recognized the economic superiority of the franchisor in the oil franchise relationship, see note 23 supra, only recently have they
begun to accept explicitly the fiduciary model of franchising. In Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609
F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), cer. denied,48 U.S.L.W. 3693 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1980), the court stated:
[T]he dealer-oil company relationship has been the subject of much recent litigation, and
the current trend of authority recognizes that a franchise relationship exists between a
service station dealer and the oil company whose trademark the dealer is promoting.
Inherent in afranchiserelationshon isafiduciaryduty.
609 F.2d at 881 (emphasis added).
The Arnoat court concluded that the district court was correct in instructing the jury that a
fiduciary relationship existed, making termination proper only if "good cause" existed. Id. at 884.
The court cited the South Dakota good cause termination statute, S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 37-5A-66(7) (1977), and the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act to support the fiduciary relationship theory, although the decision rested on neither statute since the termination occurred prior to
their passage. 609 F.2d at 883.
Professor Brown, the leading advocate of the fiduciary model, suggests that the following
principles should govern the franchise relationship: (1)when one has power to control another, a
fiduciary obligation exists; (2) a fiduciary's duty is coextensive with his power to control; and (3)
when the power to control another is abused by preference of oneself, equity will intervene.
Brown 664. See generally Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965) (upholding an FTC
injunction prohibiting a franchisor from forcing its service station dealers to buy their tires from
Goodyear, with whom the franchisor had entered into a promotional contract). See also FTC v.
Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
31. Brown & Cohen, supra note 26, at 1163; cf.Symposium, The Franchise RelationshoAbuses andRemedies, 33 OHio ST. L.J.641, 663-64 (1972) (arguing that the mutual fiduciary duty
model of franchising is not workable, and proposing mandatory collective bargaining between the
franchisor and an agent representing all franchisees to secure fairness in the franchise agreement).
32. Hearings227 (statement of D.R. Martin). While scholarly commentary played some role
in the development of franchise legislation, the real impetus for regulation came from the service
station franchisees, through their dealer organizations. See Jordan 856. See generally Hearings.
33. See note 2 supra.
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terminations without "good cause," regardless of the terms of the
franchise contract. These statutes are a clear step toward acceptance of
34
the fiduciary theory of franchising.
Many franchisors have asserted that the state franchise statutes are
unconstitutional in some respect. For example, franchisors defending
against actions brought under these statutes have successfully asserted

impairment of contract claims.35 They have argued with less success
that the statutes are void for vagueness, 36 unreasonably restrain inter38
state commerce, 37 or violate due process.
The desire to regulate terminations of all oil franchises led to proposals for a federal oil franchise statute. These proposals were sup-

ported by the major oil companies, who preferred a uniform federal
regulation to fifty different state standards. 3 9 Despite support from

both oil companies and dealers for federal legislation, it took five years
for Congress to pass the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act.4 0 This
34. See notes 26-31 supra and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Globe Liquor Co. v. Four Roses Distillers Co., 281 A.2d 19 (Del.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 873 (1971), which held that the Delaware franchise termination law is an unconstitutional impairment of contracts when applied to franchises existing before the effective date of the

act:
We think the Delaware Franchise Security Law. . . makes a substantive change in the
rights and obligations under this contract. These substantive changes are the imposition
on [the franchisor] of the obligation to deal with [the franchisee] indefinitely and the
imposition of a penalty. . . if [the franchisor insists] on its contractual rights.
281 A.2d at 21. Cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Paradee Oil Co., 343 A.2d 610, 611 (Del. 1975)
(Delaware franchise law does not unconstitutionally impair franchise contracts entered into after
the effective date of the statute). See also Note, supra note 3, at 1499. Although the contract
clause, U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 10, cl. I, does not limit federal legislation, impairment of contract
may be a violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See generally Hochman, The
Supreme Court and the Constitutionalityof Retroactive Legislation,73 HARV. L. REv. 692 (1960).
36. See, e.g., Globe Liquor Co. v. Four Roses Distillers Co., 281 A.2d 19, 21 (Del.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971).
37. See, e.g., Westfield Centre Serv., Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 158 N.J. Super. 455, 482-84,
386 A.2d 448, 463-64 (1978).
38. See, e.g., id. at 478-79, 386 A.2d at 459; Globe Liquor Co. v. Four Roses Distillers Co.,
281 A.2d 19, 23 (Del.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971).
39. A Shell Oil Company executive put it this way:
This hodgepodge of state legislation thus far has greatly increased the administrative
burden and expense of the supplier in conducting the relationships existing between him
and his dealers and jobbers ....
Shell is not opposed to federal legislation which would equitably regulate the distributor or dealer relationship, provided . . . that such legislation . . . preempts and
takes precedence over all such controls which are not the same as the federal controls.
Hearings227 (statement of D.R. Martin). The Act does preempt state law to the extent that it is
inconsistent with the federal statute. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2806 (West Supp. 1979).
40. Begining in 1973 Congress began to hold hearings and issue reports dealing with the
problems of retail gasoline franchisees, but it was not until 1978 that the Petroleum Marketing
Practices Act was finally passed. See FairMarketing ofPetroleum ProductsAct: Hearings on S,
1599 Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate Comm on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973); S. REP. No. 1071, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); FranchisesPetroleum Dealers: Hearingson
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delay did, however, give the drafters of the Act the opportunity to observe the problems encountered by state franchise regulation statutes
4
and to alter accordingly the approach of the Act. '
The legislative history of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act
reveals that Title I was passed to reduce the disparity in bargaining
power between the oil franchisor and his franchisee. 42 Title I seeks to
effectuate the "reasonable expectations of the parties to a motor fuel

franchise [who believe] that the relationship will be a continuing
H-.A 16510 Before the Subcomm. on CommunicationsandPower of the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Fair Marketing ofPetroleum ProductsAct."
Hearingson S. 323 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R, REP.
No. 1615, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1762, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Problems
of Small Retail PetroleumMarketers: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Energy and Environment
of the House Comm. on Small Business, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); PetroleumMarketing Practices: Hearingson HA 13000Before the Subcomm. on Energy andPower of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Petroleum Marketing PracticesHearingson HR. 130 Before the Subcomm. on Energy andPowerof the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., IstSess. (1977); PetroleumMarketingPracticesAct. Hearings
on S. 19 Before the Subcomm. on Energy Conservation and Regulation of the Senate Comm. on
Energy and NaturalResources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); ProposedPetroleumMarketing Practices.4et: Hearingsan H.R. 130 Before the Subcomm. on Energy andPowerof the House Conm. on
Interstateand Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. REP. No. 161; S. REP. No.
731, supra note 9; S.REP. No. 732, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
41. For example, the drafters of the Act realized that subjecting pre-existing franchises to the
termination provisions amounted to the unconstitutional taking of the franchisor's property without compensation. Agreements that existed prior to the Act's passage were exempted from the
termination provisions of Title 1, although failures to renew pre-existing relationships were
brought within the statute's purview. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2802(a) (West Supp. 1979); see H.R. REP. No.
161, at 22. See also Frisard v. Texaco Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1094, 1098 (E.D. La. 1978).
Despite the drafters' efforts, the constitutionality of the Act remains an unresolved issue. One
court interpreting a New Jersey franchise statute similar to the Act questioned whether the statute
violated due process by forbidding a franchisor from terminating a franchisee in order to withdraw all his marketing operations from the economic region:
[I]t is arguable that to prohibit a franchisor from discontinuing all business within the
state would. . . deprive the franchisor of liberty or property without due process of law
.... And if an imposed obligation to continue marketing in New Jersey is thought to
be justified by the franchisor's election to grant or renew franchises in the statp with
knowledge of the statutory requirement, the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions"
may well be invoked against the statute.
Consumer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 488 F.2d 816, 819 (3d Cir. 1973). Although it did
not reach the merits of the constitutional claims, the Consumer Oil court was persuaded that such
claims "would not be frivolous." Id.
Although section 2802(b)(2)(E) of the Act does provide for terminations due to a withdrawal
from the economic region by the franchisor, see note 63 infra, the many conditions placed upon
the franchisor before he may terminate under this section make it unclear whether the constitutional problems raised in Consumer Oil have been surmounted by the Act.
The Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1221 (1976), which prohibits automobile franchise terminations without good cause, has withstood constitutional challenges based
on due process, vagueness, and freedom to contract. Blenke Bros. v. Ford Motor Co., 203 F.
Supp. 670, 672-73 (N.D. Ind. 1962).
42. H. R. REP. No. 161, at 14-15.

Vol. 1980:522]

531

GASOLINE FRANCHISE TERMINATIONS

one."'4 3 The statute also attempts to avoid "the prospect of nonrenewal
for arbitrary or discriminatory grounds [that] threatens the indepen-

dence of the franchisee as a competitive influence in the marketplace."44

II.

THE PROVISIONS OF THE PETROLEUM MARKETING

PRACTICES ACT

The provisions of Title I of the Petroleum Marketing Practices
46
have been described as "unusual, circuitous, and complex.
The complexity and detail of the statute are attributable at least in part
to a desire to avoid the vagueness problems that plagued state "good
cause" termination statutes. 47 The result, however, is a statute that is
48
difficult to interpret and understand.
The first step in analyzing the Act is to understand the statute's
definitions of "franchise" and "franchise relationship." The statute defines a "franchise" as an agreement between an oil supplier and an oil
dealer in which the supplier permits the dealer to use the supplier's
trademark in connection with the sale of motor fuel.49 The Act also
treats the lease of the service station property to the dealer as part of
the franchise.50 The term "franchise relationship" is defined as "the
Act 45

respective motor fuel marketing or distribution obligations

. . .

of a

franchisor and a franchisee which result from the marketing of motor
fuel under a franchise."'5 1 This statutory language recognizes that the
"franchise relationship" extends beyond the bare bones of a contract or
franchise agreement.5 2 Such a recognition is significant, as it demon53
strates congressional acceptance of the fiduciary model of franchising.
43. Id. 15.
44. Id. 16.
45. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2801-2806 (West Supp. 1979).
46. Gilderhus v. Amoco Oil Co., 470 F. Supp. 1302, 1303-04 (D. Minn. 1979).

47. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
48. The language of the Act is so complicated that the statute itself requires that the Depart-

ment of Energy publish a "simple and concise" summary of the remedies and obligations imposed. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2804(d)(1) (West Supp. 1979). A franchisor who gives a termination notice
to a franchisee is required to furnish a copy of this summary to the dealer. Id. § 2803(c)(3)(C).
49. "The term 'franchise' means any contract ... under which a refiner or distributor...
authorizes ... a retailer ... to use, in connection with the sale ... of motor fuel, a trademark
Id. § 2801(1)(A).
which is owned or controlled by such refiner.
50. Id. § 2801(1)(B)(i).
51.

Id. § 2801(2).

52. "The concept of a franchise relationship is an important one. . . because it is defined
and treated under the PMPA, as an entity separate from the franchise, or contract." Frisard v.
Texaco Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1094, 1098 (E.D. La. 1978).
53. See notes 26-31 supra and accompanying text.
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Termination andNonrenewal.
Under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, franchisors seeking

to terminate a franchisee5 4 must initiate the termination process by giving the franchisee notice at least ninety days prior to termination.5 5
Furthermore, a franchisor must give notice of termination within 60,
90, or 120 days (depending on the reason) after he discovers or should
discover the reason for terminating.5 6 This is to prevent the franchisor
from renewing old complaints against the franchisee as an excuse for
57

termination.

Notice is only the first requirement for termination under the Act.
Having complied with the notice requirements, the franchisor may terminate only for "good cause," as defined by the statute.5 8 Thus, the
franchisor may terminate only (1) if the franchisee fails to comply with
a franchise provision that is "both reasonable and of material significance to the franchise relationship";5 9 (2) if the franchisee fails to exert
54. Because of congressional concerns about fifth amendment due process challenges, the

termination provisions of the Act do not apply to franchises entered into before the effective date
of the statute. H.R. REP. No. 161, at 22. The Act does apply, however, to a failure to renew a
franchise relationship entered into prior to the Act's passage.
If the provisions of this title were made applicable to franchise terminations, in the
case of franchises entered into prior to date of enactment of the legislation, it might be
contended by the franchisor that the limitations imposed by the legislation upon termination rights such franchisor may have under the franchise agreement denies [sic] him
the benefit of a valuable property right and thereby amounts [sic] to a "taking" of property without payment ofjust compensation. The legislation, therefore, contemplates that
the franchisor may, if permitted to do so by applicable State law or the provisions of the
franchise agreement, terminate a franchise entered into prior to the date of enactment of
the legislation (and not renewed thereafter) without regard to the provisions of this title
once such a termination is effected. In such a case, the franchisor is required to renew
the "franchise relationship" unless a grounds for non-renewal exists under this title.
Id. Although the franchisor must renew the franchise agreement in this situation, he may bargain
(in good faith) for new terms or conditions. By allowing the franchisors to bargain for new terms
prior to renewing a franchise agreement, Congress sought to avoid the charge that the renewal
requirement is a taking of the franchisor's property without compensation. Id. See 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 2802(a) (West Supp. 1979).
55. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2804 (West Supp. 1979). If the franchisor is withdrawing from the economic region, he must give 180 days' notice and also notify the governor of the affected state. A
shorter notice period is permitted if "reasonable." Id. § 2804(b)(1).
56. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 2802(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1979).
57. H.R. REP.No. 161, at 24. The oil companies argued unsuccessfully against the inclusion
of this provision: "By charging franchisors with constructive knowledge [of a reason to terminate
the franchise]-or what they would have known had they attempted to find out-and providing a
short time frame within which the franchisor may act, this provision will make franchise termination extremely difficult, even when there is good cause." Hearings 219-20 (statement of Douglas
G. Linn).
58. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2802 (West Supp. 1979).
59. Id. § 2802(b)(2)(A). In Malone v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 474 F. Supp. 306 (D.
Md. 1979), the court denied a motion for a preliminary injunction brought by the franchisee,
Malone, who had been terminated by Crown for failure to comply with a "minimum gallonage"
requirement. The Malone court found both that the "'minimum gallonage' requirement was an
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60
good faith efforts to carry out the provisions of the franchise;
(3) if an event occurs that is relevant to the franchise relationship and
that makes termination "reasonable"; 6 1 (4) if the franchisor reaches a
written agreement with the franchisee to end the franchise relationship;62 or (5) if the franchisor is withdrawing from the economic re3
gion.6
integral and a reasonable part of Crown's marketing strategy," id. at 310, and that Malone's failure to comply-or even to make a good faith effort to comply-rendered termination by Crown
permissible under section 2802(b)(2)(A) of the Act. 474 F. Supp. at 311-12.
60. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2802(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1979). The franchisor may terminate for this
reason only if the franchisee has been apprised in writing of his failures and has been given a
reasonable opportunity to correct them. Id. § 2802(b)(2)(B)(i); H.R. REP. No. 161, at 24.
61. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2802(b)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1979). Another section of Title I further defines
this rather broad provision by providing a list of events that would make termination "reasonable." These events include fraud or criminal misconduct by the franchisee, the declaration of
bankruptcy by the franchisee, or the loss of title to the leasehold through exercise of eminent
domain. Id. § 2802(c). The legislative history of the Act suggests that this statutory listing "is not
exclusive. . . . However, the enumerated list is intended to provide a measure of Congressional
intent with respect to the meaning of this statutory standard." H.R. REP. No. 161, at 28. Thus, a
court can determine that an event not listed is a "reasonable" ground for termination, but should
"carefully scrutinize" the situation before reaching that conclusion. Id.
62. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2802(b)(2)(D) (West Supp. 1979). The agreement to terminate must be
entered into no earlier than 180 days prior to the date of termination. This is to prevent the
franchisor from forcing the franchisee to sign a mutual termination agreement at the inception of
the franchise relationship. H.R. REP. No. 161, at 24.
63. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2802(b)(2)(E) (West Supp. 1979). This provision applies to franchisors
who are withdrawing their marketing operations from an entire geographic marketing area both
in good faith and in the normal course of business. For purposes of this provision a "'relevant
geographic marketing area' [is] a State or a standard metropolitan statistical area as periodically
established by the Office of Management and Budget." Id. § 2801(16). Under section
2802(b)(2)(E), if a franchisor terminates or fails to renew because he is withdrawing from the
marketing area, he must give the franchisee a right of first refusal on the sale of the leased marketing premises. If the franchisor sells the property to a third party, the third party must offer the
franchisee a franchise on terms similar to other franchise agreements made by the new franchisor
in the area. Id. § 2802(b)(2)(E). This requirement could act as a restraint on alienation since the
franchise seems almost to "run with the land."
The provisions of section 2802(b)(2)(E) apply equally to franchise agreements that were entered into prior to the effective date of the Act and to agreements entered into after that date that
offered or granted a term of three years or longer. From these provisions alone it would appear
that a franchise agreement entered into after the effective date of the Adt and renewable yearly
would not be susceptible to termination or nonrenewal by reason of withdrawal from the geographic market area. The Act, however, provides in section 2803(b)(3) a mechanism known as an
"interim franchise." A franchisor who qualifies for termination or nonrenewal under section
2802(b)(2)(E), but who does not meet the three-year term requirement, can refuse to renew the
original franchise and enter instead into an interim franchise. When the interim franchise expires
the franchisor is freed from the franchise relationship. The duration of the interim franchise must
be "conspicuously" set out in writing. Id. § 2803(b)(3)(D); see H.R. REP. No. 161, at 29.
These complicated statutory provisions apparently are designed to force those franchisors
who have entered into franchise agreements with terms of less than three years to renew the
franchise agreement at least once before they may withdraw from the region for economic reasons. The requirement reflects congressional fear that franchisors could use spurious "business
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Each of the above grounds for termination under the Act also applies to failures to renew a franchise agreement when it expires. In

addition, under statutory provisions that apply only to nonrenewals,

64

the franchisor may refuse to renew (1) if the franchisor and franchisee
fail to agree on terms for the new contract, provided that the franchisor
bargains in good faith;65 (2) if the franchisor receives "numerous bona

fide complaints" about the franchisee's operation and the franchisee is
both apprised of the complaints and given an opportunity to correct
deficiencies; 66 (3) if the franchisee fails to operate clean and safe premises-again, provided that the franchisee is given an opportunity to
mend his ways; 67 or (4) if the franchisor (subject to certain franchise

term restrictions) decides "in good faith and in the normal course of
business" to alter, convert, or sell the service station premises or if it is
"uneconomical" for the franchisor to continue the franchise relation68
ship.

reasons" as a means of avoiding the Act's requirements. The fairness and economic efficiency of
this method, however, is questionable. See notes 114-35 infra and accompanying text.
A new franchisor wishing to avoid the entanglement of the Act can enter into a "trial
franchise" agreement for oneyear. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2803(b)(1) (West Supp. 1979). A trial franchise
is not subject to any of the nonrenewal provisions of the Act, although proper notice of nonrenewal is required. Id. § 2803(c)(1). If at the end of the trial franchise the franchisor is not completely certain that he wants an extended relationship with his franchisee, he is well-advised to
withdraw quickly. Once a trial franchise is extended past a year it becomes a conventional
franchise, thus falling under the Act's tight control. H.R. REP. No. 161, at 29. See Wojciechowski
v. Amoco Oil Co., 483 F. Supp. 109 (E.D. Wis. 1980), in which the court held a trial franchise
invalid because of a technical violation of the Act's notice provisions. In so holding, the court
stated: "In effect, the Court is depriving the defendant of the right to treat plaintiff as a 'trial
franchise.' Therefore, defendant must comply with the [Act's nonrenewal provisions] before the
nonrenewal can take effect." Id. at 114.
64. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2802(b)(3) (West Supp. 1979).
65. Id. § 2802(b)(3)(A).
66. Id. § 2802(b)(3)(B). See Frisard v. Texaco Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1094 (E.D. La. 1978).
67. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2802(b)(3)(C) (West Supp. 1979). See Saad v. Shell Oil Co., 460 F. Supp.
114 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
68. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2802(b)(3)(D) (West Supp. 1979). The determination by the franchisor
that continuation of the franchise would be "uneconomical" cannot be based solely on the fact
that it would be more profitable for the franchisor to operate the service station himself. See H.R.
REP. No. 161, at 27. The legislative history also states that in making the determination that a
franchise continuation would be uneconomical, the court should "avoid judicial scrutiny of the
business judgment [of the franchisor]." Id. 28. It is difficult to see, however, how a court faced
with a Title I termination case can avoid examining the context of the business relationships of the
parties. See, e.g., Malone v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 474 F. Supp. 306, 310 (D. Md. 1979)
(the court considered a franchisor's market position in reaching its decision in a Title I case). See
also notes 114-35 infra and accompanying text.
A franchise agreement entered into before the effective date of the Act (June 19, 1978) is
subject to the nonrenewal provisions in section 2802(b)(3)(D) only if the unexpired term of the
franchise-as of the Act's date of enactment-was three years or longer. If the franchise agree-

Vol. 1980:522]

B.

GASOLINE FR4NCHISE TERMINATIONS

535

Actions Under the Petroleum Marketing PracticesAct.

If a termination or nonrenewal does occur, and the franchisee
believes that the franchisor has not complied with the Act, the statute
authorizes the franchisee to bring a suit in federal court. 69 The
plaintiff-franchisee may be entitled to a preliminary injunction to
maintain the status quo until the resolution of the issue.70 If the franchisee prevails on the merits, he can obtain a permanent injunction 7
against termination or nonrenewal and can obtain actual and punitive
72
damages.
ment was entered into or renewed on or after the date of the Act, section 2802(b)(3)(D) applies
only if the franchisee was offered or granted a franchise term of three years or longer.
Despite the similarity of the three-year term requirement under this section and the threeyear term requirement under section 2802(b)(2)(E), there is no provision under section
2802(b)(3)(D) for an "interim franchise." See note 63 supra. The reason for this inconsistency is
unclear. This difference may effectively disallow all nonrenewals of year-to-year franchise agreements under section 2802(b)(3)(D).
69. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2805 (West Supp. 1979). The action can also be brought in state court.
See Ted's Tire Serv. Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 470 F. Supp. 163, 165 (D. Conn. 1979).
70. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2805(b) (West Supp. 1979). The court may grant a temporary injunction if
the franchisee proves actual termination or nonrenewal, shows that there are "sufficiently serious
questions going to the merits to make. . . a fair ground for litigation," and demonstrates that the
hardships imposed on the franchisor if temporary relief is granted will be less than the hardships
on the franchisee if the relief is not granted. Id. § 2805(b)(2). The court is not required to exercise
its equity powers if the franchisee waits more than 90 days after notice of termination or nonrenewal to bring an action. Id. § 2805(b)(4)(A); see, e.g., Sachi v. Mobil Oil Corp., 1980-1 TRADE
CAS. (CCH) 163,044 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
The majority of the cases arising under the Act to date have involved motions for preliminary
injunctions. The courts have recognized that "the Act sets forth a preliminary injunction standard
that is significantly more lenient than the general equity standards for preliminary injunctions."
Gilderhus v. Amoco Oil Co., 470 F. Supp. 1302, 1303 (D. Minn. 1979). See, e.g., Sexe v. Husky
Oil Co., 475 F. Supp. 135 (D. Mont. 1979) (termination by Husky because of a dispute over rental
policies raised a question on the merits sufficient to warrant issuance of a temporary injunction);
el.Pearman v. Texaco Inc., 480 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (termination by Texaco because of
a dealer's refusal to pay a rental increase held insufficient to warrant issuance of a temporary
injunction). See also Marini v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 475 F. Supp. 142 (D.N.J. 1979) (temporary
injunction granted because of evidence of coercion by a franchisor); Saad v. Shell Oil Co., 460 F.
Supp. 114, 117 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
71. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2805(b)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
72. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2805(d) (West Supp. 1979). "If the franchisee prevails in any action under
[the Act], such franchisee shall be entitled ... consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Proce" Id. § 2805(d)(1)(A). Exemplary damages are available when the
dure, to actual damages ..
court determines that the franchisor has acted in "wilful disregard" of the requirements of the Act.
Id. § 2805(d)(l)(B). Cases decided under the federal Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1976), may provide guidance in determining damages under Title I of the
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act. Under the federal Automobile Act courts have allowed recovery for loss of future profits in franchise termination cases. See Randy's Studebaker Sales, Inc.
v. Nissan Motor Corp., 533 F.2d 510, 518 (10th Cir. 1976). Furthermore, one court has allowed
the use of actuarial tables showing the dealer's lifespan in order to determine damages, if the jury
believes that the franchise would have been renewable throughout the dealer's lifetime. Garvin v.
American Motors Sales Corp., 202 F. Supp. 667, 672 (W.D. Pa. 1962), rev'don othergrounds, 318
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In a suit under the Act, the franchisee's initial burden is to show

only a prospective or actual termination or nonrenewal. The burden
then shifts to the franchisor to prove compliance with the requirements
of the Act.73 The statute thus establishes a presumption that any termination or nonrenewal is illegal and forces the franchisor to prove that
his action falls within one of the defined exceptions to the "no termina74
tion" rule.

One unusual section of the Act provides a built-in equitable defense for the franchisor in a suit brought under the statute. 75 If the
franchisor fails to renew a relationship for reasons such as a desire to
alter, convert, or sell the premises or a desire to withdraw from the
economic region, but he fails to satisfy fully the requirements of the
statute for nonrenewals, 76 the court may not award the franchisee per-

manent injunctive relief.77 Nevertheless, the franchisee may be entitled
to actual damages as a result of the nonrenewal. 78 This provision apparently is designed to provide relief to franchisors whose economic
circumstances make nonrenewal imperative. The right of the fran-

chisee to actual damages is thought adequate to protect his interests in
79
this situation.
III.

PROBLEMS IN JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE PETROLEUM
MARKETING PRACTICES ACT

Although Title I of the Act attempts to describe explicitly the
rights and obligations of the franchisor in a termination situation,
much is necessarily left to judicial interpretation. In fact, the legislative
history of the Act indicates that Congress deliberately left some of the
Title I provisions vague to allow for judicial consideration of all facts
F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1963). See also Shor-Line Rambler, Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp., 543
F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1976) (jury award of ten years' future profits upheld in a franchise termination
case); American Motors Sales Corp. v. Semke, 384 F.2d 192, 200 (10th Cir. 1967) (damages for
wrongful termination "must include the amount of money that the dealer could have obtained in
the future from the profits from his franchise").
73. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2805(c) (West Supp. 1979). The oil companies strongly opposed this provision of the Act. They contended that the franchisee should bear the burden of coming forward
with the evidence showing that the termination or nonrenewal violated the statute. Placing the
burden on the defendant to prove a lawful termination is, according to one oil company, "contrary
to our system of laws." Hearings 220 (statement of Douglas G. Linn).
74. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2802(a) (West Supp. 1979).
75. Id. § 2805(e)(I).
76. The three-year term, see note 63 supra, is an example of one of these requirements.
77. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2805(e)(1) (West Supp. 1979); see H.R. REP. No. 161, at 31-32. The
franchisor must be acting in good faith in order to receive the benefit of this provision. 15
U.S.C.A. § 2805(e)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1979).
78. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2805(e)(2) (West Supp. 1979).
79. See note 72 supra.
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relevant to the Act's interpretation. 0 For example, the courts enjoy
great discretion in deciding whether a termination was due to "[a] failure by the franchisee to exert good faith efforts to carry out the provisions of the franchise" 8' or due to the "occurrence of an event which is
82
relevant to the franchise relationship."
In exercising this discretion, the courts should consider two major
factors. First, they should look to decisions under the trademark laws
and consider whether a strict interpretation of the Act in favor of the
franchisee will violate the spirit of trademark law, which requires
franchisors to maintain "quality control" over their franchisees. 83 Sec-

ond, the courts should consider the statute in light of the economic and

commercial realities that influenced the actions of the parties. 84 Con-

sideration of the commercial setting of the parties' franchise relationship can be especially crucial to a just result because of the

unpredictability of the present gasoline market. Ultimately, resolution
of Title I termination cases necessarily involves consideration of the
85
interests of the franchisee, the franchisor, and consumers.
A.

The Petroleum Marketing PracticesAct's Relationship to
Trademark Law.

The Petroleum Marketing Practices Act defines a "franchise" as a
contract between an oil supplier and an oil dealer in which the oil supplier "authorizes or permits [the dealer] to use. . . a trademark which
is owned or controlled" by the supplier.86 It is appropriate that the
80. S.REP. No. 731, supra note 9, at 38, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 896. "[T]he
legislation leaves to the courts the task of resorting to traditional principles of equity to maximize
Id. 43, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at
attainment of the competing statutory objectives.
901.
81. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2802(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1979).
82. Id. § 2802(b)(2)(C). One example of sensible use of judicial discretion under this section
of Title I is Lanham v. Amoco Oil Co., 481 F. Supp. 405 (D. Md. 1979). In Lanham the court held
that the death of the franchisee was adequate grounds for terminating the franchise. The court
found that although death was not "expressly cited" as grounds for termination under the Act,
"the clear implication" of section 2802(b)(2)(C) was to allow termination in this type of situation.
481 F. Supp. at 407.
83. See notes 86-113 infra and accompanying text.
84. See notes 114-34 infra and accompanying text.
85. During the hearings on the Act, Representative Clarence Brown of Ohio summed up the
difficult balancing of interests involved in franchise regulation:
I neither want to write a bill that is going to make it possible for the major oil companies
to ... totally run the gasoline market; nor do I want to put something into law that tilts
the laws about property so far in favor of the franchisee that he is in a position to run the
world on his own; nor do I want to leave out somebody who provides the consumer with
a considerable advantage in price, because we have a lot more consumers than. . . dealers.
Hearings 191.
86. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2801(l)(A) (West Supp. 1979).
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statute defines a franchise in terms of a license to use a trademark because "[t]he central element of most franchises. . is a license granted
to the franchisee to use the franchisor's trademark. . . . This right to
do business under a well known brand name is usually the single most

87
valuable asset acquired by a franchisee ....
The trademark is also an integral part of the "joint venture" model
of franchising.8 8 The franchisor provides the franchisee with the nationally known name and products that attract business to the fran-

chisee's operation. In return, the franchisee, through good service to
the public, increases the "good will" associated with the trademark.8 9

Thus the franchisee's contribution to the intangible good will of the
trademark gives him a "vested property" 90 right in the mark and forms

the basis for requiring good cause before terminating his interest in the
franchise.

Given this strong relationship between trademark rights and
franchising, the Lanham Act 9 '-which regulates trademark and
tradename rights-may play a role in how courts resolve cases brought
under Title I of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act. Courts have
long held that the licensor of a trademark has a duty under the Lanham

Act to control the quality of his mark so that the public will not be
deceived:
If the owner of a trademark wants to license the use thereof to another and still retain as his own the enjoyment of the rights stemming
therefrom, he must do so in such a way that he maintains sufficient
control over the nature and quality of the finished product, over the
activities of the licensee, as will enable the licensor to sustain his
87. J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:20, at 644 (1973) (quoting
Handler, Franchising and Business Independence, in THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST 153 (R. Low
ed. 1968) (citations omitted)). "'The cornerstone of a franchise system must be the trademark or
trade name of the product.' Many franchise contracts can be legally characterized as a skeleton of
a trademark license fleshed out with many duties and restrictions imposed upon the franchisee."
J. MCCARTHY, supra, at 644 (quoting Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636, 640 (S.D.N.Y.
1962), aff'd, 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964)). Another observer has noted:
While franchises defy placement into the conventional categories of commercial relationships, they may be readily identified by the central role played by the franchisor's
trademark . . . . Indeed, a franchise may be fairly defined as a license to use the
franchisor's identifying marks as a means of securing the economics of its national advertising and consumer identification-the franchisor's accumulated customer good will.
Note, supra note 3, at 1488.
88. See notes 26-31 supra and accompanying text.
89. Each franchisee is a part of a complex marketing system in which the public is encouraged to make its choice as to filling stations to patronize based on the personal service facilities and the cleanliness of these facilities. A breakdown in any one facility can
seriously affect others in the system.
Saad v. Shell Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 114, 117 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
90. Brown & Cohen, supra note 26, at 1161.
91. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1115-1127 (1976).
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original position of guarantor to the public that the goods now bearing the trademark are of the same nature and quality as were the
goods bearing the trademark before the licensing ....92
If the franchisor, as trademark owner, fails to exercise proper control
over the licensee of his trademark, the courts may say that the
franchisor has abandoned 93 his mark and has lost "the. . .exclusive
right to use the registered mark in commerce. .... ,,94
Not surprisingly, some courts have noticed a tension between the
"quality control" requirements of the trademark laws and the "good
cause" termination statutes, which tend to lessen the ability of the
franchisor to influence the actions of his franchisees. Marinello v. Shell
Oil Co. 95 illustrates judicial recognition of this problem. In Marinello,

the plaintiff brought an action in federal district court under a New
Jersey franchise termination statute9 6 that was similar to Title I of the
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act. The Marinello court first determined that "[t]he Lanham Act, which constitutes the federal statutory
law of trademarks, [was] properly at issue. . .. ,,97 The court went on
to find that the New Jersey Supreme Court's rule announced in a related case, Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello,98 requiring "good cause" for
franchise termination, was "invalid and inapplicable," 99 because a state
requirement of "good cause" before termination had the effect of

"whittl[ing] the rights of the owner of a federally registered trademark
and correspondingly enlarg[ing] the rights of a licensee in such a trade-00 The state "good cause" regulation "collide[d] with the
mark. . ...
Lanham Act's preemptive grant to its owner of total control of a federally registered trademark."' 01 The Marinello court therefore held that
92. Morse-Starrett Prods. Co. v. Steccone, 86 F. Supp. 796, 804 (N.D. Cal. 1949); see Denison
Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403, 409 (5th Cir. 1962); Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's
Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1959); J. MCCARTHY, supra note 87, § 18:16.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (1976).
94. Id. § 1115(b). The amount of control the licensor of a mark must maintain over his
licensee in order to avoid abandonment of the mark is not clear, for "It]he courts have been
hopelessly inconsistent in defining how much is needed to satisfy the requirement of quality control over trademark licensees." J. MCCARTHY, supra note 87, § 18:17, at 639.
95. 368 F. Supp. 1401 (D.N.J. 1974), rev'd, 511 F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1975).
96. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:10-1 to -12 (West Supp. 1977). See note 99 infra.
97. 368 F. Supp. at 1405.
98. 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974).
99. 368 F. Supp. at 1407. Technically, the series of cases involving Shell and Marinello did
not involve the New Jersey Franchise Practice Act since that act was not in effect at the time of the
litigation. Nevertheless, the New Jersey act clearly served as a basis for decision in this line of
cases since it "put into statutory form the extant public policy of [the] State." Shell Oil Co. v.
Marinello, 63 N.J. at 409, 307 A.2d at 602.
100. 368 F. Supp. at 1407.
101. Id.
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under the supremacy clause10 2 the offending state law "must give way
03

to federal" law.
The court of appeals reversed,'°4 finding that the Lanham Act regulated trademarks only to the extent necessary to prevent the deception
of the public and to protect the investor. The court then stated that
"[nlo deception of the public is suggested and no dilution of Shell's
investment in its trademark is alleged to have occurred. . . ."105 Thus
the court held that the state good cause termination requirements in

06
question were not preempted by the Lanham Act.'
The district court and court of appeals opinions in Marinello

demonstrate the tension between trademark regulation and franchise

regulation. The Petroleum Marketing Practices Act gives the franchisee security by making it difficult for the franchisor to terminate or
fail to renew the franchise relationship. The Lanham Act, on the other
hand, imposes a duty on the franchisor to maintain control over the
licensees of his mark, so that the mark will continue to represent the

quality of goods and services that the public has come to expect. Because even one low-quality station can hurt the reputation of the entire
trademark chain, franchisors have a strong incentive to control the
07
quality of each of their stations.
While the principle of quality control is based on trademark law,
any erosion of the principle has effects beyond simply decreasing the

significance of trademarks. If the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act
prevents legitimate dealer quality control requirements by making it
more difficult and costly for franchisors to terminate recalcitrant franchisees, consumers could be hurt by the reduction in the quality of

service. 1 Consider the hypothetical case of a gas station dealer who
dilutes his gasoline with water. The oil company franchisor attempts to
102. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
103. 368 F. Supp. at 1407.
104. Marinello v. Shell Oil Co., 511 F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1975).
105. Id. at 858.
106. Id. For an analysis that agrees with the decision of the court of appeals see Comment,
Federal District Court Declares New Jersey Franchise Practices Act to be an Unconstitutional Regu.
lation of Trademark in Conflict with the Lanham Act, 6 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 155 (1974).
Of course, preemption is not a factor in the relationship between the Petroleum Marketing
Practices Act and the Lanbam Act since both are federal statutes. Nevertheless, the analysis used
by the district court in Marinello to find preemption of the state act by the Lanham Act indicates
the conflict between the goals of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act and those of the Lanham
Act.
107. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
108. See Jordan 839. Not all franchisees given greater freedom of conduct in the franchise
relationship will automatically respond by reducing the quality of service, for the franchisee also
has an economic interest in seeing business increase. Nevertheless, the force of the "quality con-
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terminate the dealer, 0 9 and the dealer brings an action under the Act,
claiming that the franchisor gave the dealer only eighty-five days notice
of the termination rather than the required ninety days." 0 A court applying the statute strictly would probably find for the dealer because of
the franchisor's five-day delinquency in notification. A superior approach would be to look beyond the dictates of the statute and to consider as well the rights and duties of the franchisor under the Lanham
Act' to control the quality of the gasoline dispensed by its franchisees. " 2 A court should also consider the right of consumers to purchase
undiluted gasoline.
In summary, courts adjudicating claims by franchisees arising
under Title I of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act should exercise
the discretion granted in the Act' '3 and should attempt to balance the
competing statutory objectives of the trademark and franchise laws. In
so doing, the courts should look not only at Title I's remedial purpose,
but also at the right of the franchisor to control the trademark and at
the need for consumer protection.
B.

The Petroleum Marketing PracticesAct and the UCC
"CommercialSetting" Standard.
The same discretion to balance competing interests' 14 that permits

tror' argument is strong because even a few bad franchises can hurt the entire trademark chain.
This is especially true of smaller chains that serve only local or regional customers.
One commentator has argued that "franchisees who want to be made secure against termination may find that the demand for this security means the end of the system within which they
operate." Jordan 840. Major oil franchisors, faced with increasing regulation of the franchise
relationship, may respond by establishing more company-owned stations. This process, called
"forward integration," could drastically reduce the number of service station franchises available.
Some states are responding to this situation by passing "divorcement" statutes that prohibit
the large oil companies from owning their own service station outlets. The Supreme Court recently upheld Maryland's divorcement statute in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117
(1978). See generally Comment, State GasolineDivorcement Statutes: Legal and Economic Implications, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 511 (1979).
109. The franchisor's argument for termination under the Act would probably be that the
dealer had engaged in "fraud or criminal misconduct. . . [that is] relevant to the operation of the
marketing premises." 15 U.S.C.A. § 2802(c)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
110. Id. § 2804(a)(2). A court could find the 85-day notice "reasonable" and deem it adequate
under the statute. Id. § 2804(b)(1). See, e.g., Frisard v. Texaco Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1094, 1101
(E.D. La. 1978) (the Act's notice requirements need not be measured with "mathematical certainty"). But see Blankenship v. Atlantic-Richfield Co., 478 F. Supp. 1016, 1018 (D. Or. 1979) (90day notice requirement held a mandatory prerequisite to termination).
11. See text accompanying notes 91-94 supra.
112. Although the franchisor could conceivably renotify the recalcitrant dealer and attempt to
terminate his dealership again, the lengthy delay inherent in that course of action makes it an
undesirable alternative.
113. See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
114. See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
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the courts to consider trademark principles in Title I cases" 15 also allows them to consider the commercial setting of the particular franchise
relationship. 116 The courts should recognize the many complex busi-

ness and economic forces that affect both the terms of a franchise relationship and termination and nonrenewal decisions.

In analyzing the importance of the commercial setting in a termination case, the courts should look to an established body of law for
guidance. The Uniform Commercial Code's unconscionability stan-

dards" 17 provide such guidance to courts faced with Title I termination

claims. Resort to the Code for aid in interpreting Title I cases is logical

since the Act "may. ..merely have federalized the unconscionability
problem between dealers and suppliers.""18 Section 2-302(2) of the

Uniform Commerical Code provides that "the parties shall be afforded
a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to.

.

.commercialset-

ling,purpose andeffect to aid the court in making the determination" of
unconscionability.1 9 Similarly, before a court concludes that a termination or nonrenewal of a franchise relationship is unlawful, it should
consider the commercial setting of the relationship.
A case illustrating the use of section 2-302(2) is Ashland Oil, Inc. v.
20
Donahue.1
The plaintiff oil company, after invoking a ten-day termination clause, brought an unlawful detainer action against its dealerfranchisee to recover possession of service station property. The court

first held that the lease and the franchise agreement between Ashland
and Donahue should be read as one contract. 12' The court went on to
find the ten-day termination clause in the agreement unconscion115. See notes 86-113 supra and accompanying text.
116. "[C]ourts ought to look closely at the realities of the marketplace" in deciding franchise
termination cases. Jordan 856. "Particularly important is that legislation dealing with [franchise
terminations] recognize the importance of providing adequate flexibility so that franchisors may
initiate changes in their marketing activities to respond to changing market conditions and consumer preferences." S. REP. No. 731, supra note 9, at 19, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws at
877.
117. U.C.C. § 2-302 provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof
may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the
determination.
118. Jordan 825 n.86.
119. U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (emphasis added).
120. 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976).
121. Id. at 437.
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able.' 22 Nevertheless, the court remanded the case for the trial court to
receive evidence "regarding the commercial setting, purpose and effect
of the transaction" before determining the ultimate resolution of the
case. 123

Other courts have considered the commercial setting in deciding
cases involving franchise relationships.124 In Tulowitzki v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. 125 the Supreme Court of Delaware upheld Atlantic Rich-

field's termination of plaintiff Tulowitzki's franchise. The court applied a "business-practices-of-the-community test [that] asks whether

the terms [of the franchise agreement] are so extreme as to appear unconscionable according to the mores and business practices of the time
and place."' 126 The Tulowitzki court found that the agreement in question was consistent with trade business practices and upheld the termination.

27

Two early decisions under Title I of the Petroleum Marketing
Practices Act suggest that courts faced with termination claims under
the Act will also consider commercial setting. In Malone v. Crown CentralPetroleum Corp.128 the court held that a "minimum gallonage" requirement in a franchise agreement was "both an integral and a
reasonable part of [the franchisor's] marketing strategy"129 and that the
failure of the franchisee to make "good faith efforts" to meet the requirement justified termination under the Act.' 30 Similarly, the court
122. Id. at 440.
123. Id.
124. See Posttape Assoc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 450 F. Supp. 407, 412 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Central Ohio Co-Operative Milk Producers, Inc. v. Rowland, 29 Ohio App. 2d 236, 239-40, 281
N.E.2d 42,44 (1972). In Raybond Elecs., Inc. v. Glen-Mar Door Mfg. Co., 22 Ariz. App. 409, 528
P.2d 160 (1974), the court stated that courts must "have the widest latitude in hearing evidence on
... Id. at 416,
the issue of commercial setting in cases where unconscionability was claimed.
528 P.2d at 167.
125. 396 A.2d 956 (Del. 1978).
126. Id. at 960; see Gordon v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 423 F. Supp. 58, 61-62 (N.D.
Ga.), aff'd, 564 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1977).
127. 396 A.2d at 962.
128. 474 F. Supp. 306 (D. Md. 1979).
129. Id. at 310.
130. Id. at 310-11. The Malone court, however, admonished the franchisor for terminating a
valued franchisee in this manner. Id at 312. The decision implied that had Crown not been a
small oil company-with a need to do high volume business--the result might have been different,
again demonstrating the importance of commercial setting.
In Sachi v. Mobil Oil Corp., 1980-1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 63,044, at 77,190 (E.D.N.Y. 1979),
the court held that Mobil Oil's nonrenewal of a franchise relationship was valid because of the
expiration of the underlying lease on the service station property. The court stated: "Congress
plainly did not intend to restrict the prerogative of the franchisor to exercise legitimate, independent business judgment in arriving at a decision not to renew an underlying lease to the franchise
premises." Id. at 77,194 (emphasis in original). Thus the Sachi court clearly recognized the need
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in Frisardv. Texaco Inc.13 1 found that Texaco's oral notices of un-

healthy conditions to its franchisee were sufficient given the business
setting surrounding the notices. 132 The Frisardcourt held that the Pe-

troleum Marketing Practices Act's notice provisions did not need to be
measured with "mathematical certainty" and therefore denied the fran-

chisee's request for a preliminary injunction to stop Texaco from terminating the franchise relationship.

33

The commercial setting factor may favor franchisees as well. The

commercial setting of a franchise relationship could persuade a court
that a termination or failure to renew is illegal. 134 Regardless of the

outcome of a termination case, the court will have an opportunity to
reach a superior decision by considering the commercial setting of the
franchise relationship.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Title I of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act attempts to address the substantial problems caused by the imbalance between the
power of franchisors and franchisees in service station franchise rela-

tionships. Although this intrusion of government regulation into a contractual business arrangement can be criticized, the prevailing view is
that the franchisee needs statutory protection from unjust termina-

tions. 135 Despite technical faults, 36 Title I should meet its primary
goal by offering significant protection to franchisees. The critical element in the ultimate success of Title I, however, will be judicial recognition of the importance of economic and legal factors apart from those
to consider business setting in rendering a decision under Title I of the Act. See also Walters v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 353, 357 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
131. 460 F. Supp. 1094 (E.D. La. 1978).
132. Plaintiff Frisard had argued that the Act required written notices of unhealthy conditions
before a franchisor could initiate a termination or nonrenewal. Id. at 1098. The statute is not
clear on this point, although written notice is explicitly required when actual termination proceedings are begun. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2804(c)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
133. 460 F. Supp. at 1101-02.
134. See Brown 669. Although the majority of early cases under the Act have been favorable
to the franchisor, the franchisee has, nevertheless, prevailed on a number of occasions. For example, in Gilderhus v. Amoco Oil Co., 470 F. Supp. 1302 (D. Minn. 1979), the court granted the
franchisee's request for a preliminary injunction to enjoin franchisor Amoco from terminating his
franchise relationship. Amoco's attempt followed the discovery that Gilderhus had been buying
oil products from another supplier. The court found that "the plaintiff has raised a substantial
question as to whether Amoco's decision to terminate was an act of discrimination" and therefore
issued the preliminary injunction. Id. at 1305. For other early decisions under the Act that were
favorable to the franchisee, see note 70 supra.
135. See notes 26-31 supra and accompanying text.
136. See, for example, the inconsistency discussed in note 68 supra.
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found on the face of the statute. 137 Regulation of the franchise relationship necessarily has an impact on three distinct groups-the
franchisor, the franchisee, and consumers-and the interests of these
groups are finely balanced. Interpretation of Title I solely in light of its
remedial purpose is likely to upset this balance and produce a "no win"
situation in which the franchisor, the consumer, and even the franchisee will suffer.
Timothy J. Corrigan

137. Again, it should be stressed that Congress intended the court to have wide discretion in
deciding Title I cases. See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.

